The aim of this paper is to investigate the link between ownership type of the bank and its corporate governance and to find an empirical background for the hypothesis about relationships between corporate governance effectiveness and bank's performance. The article also covers some theoretical backgrounds concerning regulation in banking sphere. The results of the study reveal that there is direct relationship between ownership type and corporate governance, while, on the contrary, there is no link between corporate governance and bank performance. Study findings provide the math-based recommendations to the national regulator about capital requirements.
Introduction
Generally, corporate governance is defined as a system for directing and controlling the activities of corporations. Corporate governance defines how investors oversee the activities of management, and how management is liable to investors for the company"s performance. Good corporate governance allows investors to be confident that their investment is used prudently by management in order to improve the company"s financial and business performance and, as a result, to create shareholder value.
However, good corporate governance is not limited to relations between investors and management. What is really important is that the concept of corporate governance involves the protection of and cooperation with various stakeholders who have a legitimate interest in the company"s performance, such as employees, consumers, creditors, the government, publicity, and so on. No doubt, that a company cannot exist outside the society in which it operates, and its ultimate success depends on the individual input of each stakeholder.
Therefore, the essence of corporate governance may be described as a system of relations between the company"s owners, management, and other stakeholders aimed at ensuring the sustainable performance of the company and a balance of influences and interests of the parties to corporate relations 6 . While no universal model of corporate governance exists in the world, there are generally accepted principles, or standards, of good corporate governance that may be applied within a wide range of legal, economic, and political contexts. International standards of corporate governance appeared primarily as a result of heightened public interest in corporate governance generated by the globalization of financial markets and the liberalization of capital flows. International standards of corporate governance came about as a broad response to scandals in the world"s financial community and as a desire to stabilize financial markets.
It"s evident enough nowadays that banks have a key role in any economy. They mobilize funds, allocate capital and play a decisive role in the corporate governance of other firms. All these factors mean that, when banks are efficient, they stimulate productivity growth and the prosperity of the whole economy, which even adds up to their importance. Therefore, the good corporate governance in banks has a vital impact not only on private, but also public affairs.
The bank corporate governance is a complex framework. This governance framework encompasses a bank"s shareholders, its managers, employees, and the board of directors. Moreover, banks operate under a unique system of public oversight in the form of bank supervisors and a comprehensive body of banking laws and regulations. The interaction between all of these elements determines how well the performance of the bank will satisfy the desires of its shareholders, while also complying with public objectives. For investors and regulators, this bank corporate governance framework is thus of critical importance in terms of bank"s success and its daily operations.
While the governance by bank shareholders and directors has always been treated as important issue, this topic has drawn increased attention in recent years. Among the reasons for this interest are banking deregulation and a rising role for market discipline and governance; substantial banking consolidation and resulting changes in the management, board, and ownership structure of many financial organizations; and a movement in many foreign countries from stateowned banking systems to a greater private ownership and control. Another factor for such an attention is recent corporate scandals, such as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom, and the ensuing passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with its provisions aimed at improving corporate disclosures, increasing managerial responsibility and involvement, and tightening board oversight.
However, in spite of all the attention paid to the subject, a range of opinions on what would constitute a good governance system in a bank or any other corporation still exists. In addition, a number of the bank corporate governance researches focus on a single aspect of governance, for example the role of directors or that of shareholders, while omitting other factors and interactions that may be important within this governance framework.
Such elements as managers and their ownership incentives, directors and their monitoring role, all the key policymakers/owners and the amount of wealth they have concentrated in the bank, and deposit insurance incentives and regulatory discipline -have a key influence on the governance framework at banks. As a result, the concept of corporate governance in a certain way might determine bank"s performance.
The banking sector in Ukraine has experienced rapid growth in recent years. Amidst this rapid growth, the issue of corporate governance has received considerable attention among bankers and policymakers. Moreover, foreign ownership is increasing rapidly in the country, affecting the practice of corporate governance.
This paper explores the link between ownership, corporate governance and bank performance using data about 43 banks in Ukraine during 2006 -2009.
Literature review
The concept of corporate governance grows from well-known principal-agent problem between management of the company and its finance providers. According to classical definition by Shleifer and Vishny (1999), corporate governance refers to the "ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment". A quick glance at Adam Smith"s Wealth of Nations demonstrates that the concept of corporate governance was understood as early as the eighteenth century, even though the phrase was not in use. Smith states, "the directors of companies, being managers of other people"s money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own." The idea of corporate governance was further developed in the Berle-Means (1932) paradigm of the separation of shareholders" ownership and management"s control in the corporation.
There is a wide range of literature on corporate governance, its theory and practice, but what stands to be a popular and up-to-date topic nowadays is the correlation between corporate governance and performance of the institution. There are numerous researches that provide both theoretical and empirical evidence to link the governance of the corporation to its performance. One of the essential findings concerning this issue is related to the board of directors. The board of directors is known as one of the most important instruments to solve the corporate governance problem (Jensen, 1993) , since it is the body primarily used by other stakeholders to monitor management. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) construct a model that examines the determinants of board composition as a bargaining process between the existing directors and the CEO over the incorporation of new members on the board. A more recent study by Rhoades et. al (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of 22 samples and found a weak but significant relationship between leadership structure and firm performance.
A well functioning financial system is the key to economic prosperity; hence the corporate governance within banks, the main "actors" of the financial system, and its impact on the performance has been already explored by several authors. continue their study and explore the differences between two types of banking ownership -the private domestic-owned banks and the foreignowned banks in terms of relationship between corporate governance and bank performance. They found out that foreign-owned banks in Malaysia were implementing good corporate governance and had higher advantage of increasing their performance in the pre Asian financial crisis. The findings also confirmed that private domestically owned banks are good at implementing corporate governance in the post crisis.
A significant research has focused on the effect of ownership on performance, with a number of studies examining bank privatizations (Clarke, Cull and Shirley, 2005 However, the examination of correlation between banks" corporate governance and performance with the special attention paid to the crisis changes, which is included in this study, hasn"t been presented yet. 7 The model was used as a sample for Ukraine
3.
Banking System of Ukraine: ownership structure and performance outlook
The banking system of Ukraine was founded after the adoption of the Banks and Banking Activity Act by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in March 1991. It is a two-level system and consists of the National Bank of Ukraine and banks of various types and forms of ownership.
As of January 1, 2010 there are 195 registered banks in Ukraine. The number of banks which have licenses for performance of banking operations is 175, including 53 with the participation of foreign capital, 20 of which are 100% foreign capital ones. Moreover, it could be seen from the Table 1 that the share of foreign capital in the Ukrainian banking system is experiencing the increasing trend and as of January 2010 equals almost 40%. The impact of the global economic crisis was not particularly visible in the Ukrainian banking sector prior to 4th quarter 2008 as such the data as of 1 October 2008 may be viewed as the "pre-crisis" benchmark date ( Table 2) .
As of 1 January 2010 total assets of the Ukrainian banking system contracted by 30% in US$ terms compared to a pre-crisis level as of 1 October 2008 primarily due to several reasons. First of all it"s a devaluation of national currency. Almost 60% devaluation of Ukrainian national currency against US$ in 4th quarter 2008 significantly affected the country"s banking sector. The National Bank of Ukraine introduced temporary administration for 13 banks by the end of 2009 (including three out of top 20). 14 banks were in the process of liquidation as of 1 January 2010. Pushed by the IMF and the World Bank, the Ukrainian banking regulator required all banks to increase their regulatory capital based on results of a "stresstesting". In addition, the government initiated a recapitalisation of three troubled banks, As a result, foreign investors often turned the blind eye to significant risks and control weaknesses of acquired banks, which unfortunately were exposed when the financial crisis hit the country. By the end of 2008, when it became apparent that most of banks require significant capital injections to maintain prudential compliance, many foreign investors would regret their decisions to enter the Ukrainian market.
The Source: "World Finance Review" -May 2010
Generally, the trend of the financial performance of banks in Ukraine could be seen from the Figure 2 . Indeed, the banking sector ended the year of 2009 with huge losses, especially comparing to the previous years, when there was a significant and stable increase in banks" profits. 
Corporate governance concept in Ukraine
Corporate governance is an extremely new concept in Ukraine. Corporate governance in Ukraine has been developed mostly on the basis of acts, presidential decrees, and Ukrainian State Commission on Securities and Stock Market regulations and rulings. The primary sources are the Civil and Commercial Codes (2003), acts "On Business Companies" (1991),"On Securities and Stock Exchange" (1991),"On State Regulation of the Securities Market in Ukraine" (1996) ,"On the National Depository System and Peculiarities of Electronic Circulation of Securities in Ukraine" (1997) . Current Ukrainian legislation contains a number of provisions that constitute a good start in establishing effective corporate governance practices. However, the law gives preference to the legal form and ignores the substance. There are a number of loopholes that might prevent corporate stakeholders from effective protections. For example, due to flaws in the Ukrainian judicial system and the civil and labor laws, there are no adequate mechanisms on holding officers and directors of stock companies responsible for causing harm to the company.
The gaps in the Ukrainian legislation are likely to appear because of several factors: the Ukrainian stock market has not been sufficiently developed, and circulation of securities occurs in negligible volume. More than two-thirds of all Ukrainian stock companies were established in the form of closed stock companies, shares of which, in accordance with Article 25 of the Act of Ukraine On Economic Companies, cannot be bought and sold in the market. Stock company charters often stipulate that a shareholder who wants to sell his shares offer them to the company or other shareholders first, and then only if the company or other shareholders expressly refuse the shares, can the shareholder sell to outsiders. In addition to the above-mentioned weaknesses, the appearance of big strategic investors in the Ukrainian market forms a new need to implement corporate governance principles. International creditors often require, in addition to paying off past debts and as a condition of the loan, that corporations improve their governance structures. However, this is only done on an individual basis through private agreements, and does not affect state-wide legislation. The banking sector is actually further developed than the general business sector. The concept of corporate governance in Ukrainian banks in fact got reflected in national legislation as well. The main documents on regulations that form the idea of concept of corporate governance in banks and contain information on setting corporate governing bodies in the bank are: the Civil Code of Ukraine, Banks and Banking Activity Act, Joint Stock Companies Act. All of the above mentioned documents do not contradict each other in a question of procedure of the governance formation. Shareholders are identified as these participants. Thus, employees won"t participate in the corporate governance. Obviously, Ukrainian banks use the monistic concept of corporate governance 9 , which is schematically described in Figure 3 . In fact, the issue of corporate governance continues to attract considerable attention in various national and international forums. In particular, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued a revised version of corporate governance principles in 2004. Recent events, such as the Enron and Parmalat scandals, and other noisy failures, have put corporate governance on the front pages of major newspapers. At the same time, recent developments in corporate governance are based on a firm foundation of more than a century of studies on this issue by academics in both law and economics in the United States and other Western countries. Obviously, without this fundamental knowledge the whole idea of modern corporate governance would be hard to understand. Current Ukrainian problems in this area stem from large cultural hurdles and misunderstanding of corporate governance issues not only by managers and directors, but also by legislators, lawyers, shareholders, and the general public.
Currently the main deficiencies of Ukrainian bank corporate governance legislation are:
1. Excessive shareholder authority; 2. Unclear structure and responsibilities of the bank governance bodies such as the supervisory board, management board, and revision commission;
3. Lack of supervisory board committees; 4. Absence of requirements for the internal structure of supervisory boards.
Today, a large number of countries are making a concerted effort to improve corporate governance at the national level. One way to achieve this goal is through the introduction of national principles (codes) of corporate governance. Ukraine is not an exception in this.
In December 2003 the Ukrainian Securities Commission issued its own non mandatory corporate governance principles for JSCs, which are based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (among other international codes). The process of developing Ukraine's Principles was initiated and financed by ten Ukrainian companies, each of whom has declared its recognition of the Principles. It is, however, important to note that the implementation of these Principles is not a mandatory requirement for Ukrainian companies. There is no requirement, for example, for companies listed on Ukraine's two main stock exchanges to comply with the Principles (this is in contrast to the position in the UK, where UK incorporated companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are subject to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance albeit on a 'comply or explain' basis, rather than the 'comply or be punished' basis used in the United States). In practice, the fact that adoption of the Principles is not mandatory means that only a limited number of Ukrainian companies have declared recognition of the Principles.
This limited adoption of the Principles among Ukrainian companies exists despite a significant number of companies having responded to the IFC/Corporate Development Project's 2004 survey stating that, in their view, the adoption of international best practices in corporate governance is a priority activity for the management of their company, with over 40 per cent of respondents saying that they believed that adoption would increase company profits. However, the number of companies who implemented the national or their own internal codes is still very small.
The purpose of the Principles of Corporate Governance of Ukraine is to lay down the principles and recommendations, based on international best practices of corporate governance and tailored to Ukraine"s needs and experience, which are necessary for the development of good corporate governance in Ukraine. Corporate governance is important for all types of companies and critical for corporations. This is due to the need to separate ownership from management and to ensure the protection of investor rights in a situation where the company is owned by one group of people and managed by another.
These Principles of Corporate Governance are intended for open joint stock companies traded on the stock market. The document also provides universal principles and recommendations for the efficient management of a company. Its provisions may be applied to other types of companies insofar as it is allowed by legislation governing their activity.
Even though, in 2004, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Corporate Governance Sector Assessment measured Ukrainian corporate governance legislation to be in 'very low compliance' with the OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance, there is, however, no doubt that in recent years efforts have been made in a number of sectors in Ukraine to develop a corporate governance framework, and to promote awareness of, and compliance with, this framework.
While steps have been taken, however, to alter the legislative and regulatory landscapes to improve the corporate governance framework in practice, the implementation by Ukrainian companies of these measures to increase transparency and diversification of corporate culture has not yet occurred across the broader Ukrainian corporate landscape. There has been no wholesale acceptance by Ukrainian JSCs of the concept of, or need for, good corporate governance. In general, the corporate governance practices adopted by Ukrainian companies fail to mirror the high levels set by certain other more developed European market economies or the United States.
As a general note, although it is a key principle of international corporate governance that all shareholders in the same class should be treated equally, the Ukrainian legal system, being a civil law regime, does not acknowledge the concept of 'equitable treatment' or 'equitable rights' as these may be understood and implemented by common law systems. While shareholders may seek recourse from the courts in respect of alleged violations of their shareholder rights, Ukrainian courts are unlikely to consider an action brought by a group of shareholders alleging that, for example, the company's Supervisory Council has acted inequitably (although within the strict limits of the law) towards the claimants as against a larger group of shareholders.
Since the financial crisis hit Ukraine in autumn 2008 and destabilised the business, especially the banking sector, Ukrainian banks have struggled to survive and many have been placed in temporary administration by the National Bank of Ukraine. Simultaneously, in order to support the banking system and save it from collapse, the state worked out a rescue package one of which elements includes state capitalisation of banks in need of urgent financial assistance. These anti-crisis measures introduced in Ukrainian banks had a great impact on the practice of corporate governance.
For example, some banks with the temporary administration introduced by the National Bank of Ukraine during 2009-10, had an adverse effect on the overall transparency index (calculated in Joint Research of the Financial Initiatives Agency and Standard & Poor"s). As a result of their financial difficulties, these banks did not have a full corporate governance system and did not provide the full disclosures essential for investors 10 . Indeed, out of that sample only one bank in three prepared an annual report and made it publicly available.
Moreover, introducing temporary administrations within the banks" corporate governance influenced a lot the implementation of CSR concept there. As a result of CSR concept transformation in Ukrainian banks the relations concerning information disclosure are formed only by two sides -National Bank of Ukraine and temporary administrator reporting to it as well, which is not relevant to CSR principle stating that all of the stakeholders have the right to get the disclosed information.
Bank's profitability and its relation to the some of the corporate governance effectiveness criteria: Empirical Research
Given the crucial importance of the financial intermediation role of banks in an economy (global or any national one in particular), the public and the markets have a high degree of sensitivity to any difficulties potentially arising from any corporate governance shortcomings in banks. Corporate governance is thus of great relevance both to individual banking organizations, to the national financial markets and to the international financial system as a whole. 11 It seems to be obvious -there is a strong connection between effectiveness of the corporate governance and profitability of the bank. However, under different circumstances profitability could be more influenced by factors that have no strong connection to the corporate governance. This part of the paper aims to check the hypothesis about the connection between the level of the bank"s Principles for enhancing corporate governance -consultative document. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs168.pdf corporate governance and bank"s performance. It also pays attention to the question what factors could be used as the criteria of the corporate governance effectiveness, the question which is especially important when it comes to different groups of stakeholders -from shareholders and investors to customers etc.
The corporate governance effectiveness criteria could be identified from corporate governance practices. The connection between them is shown in the following scheme (see figure  4) .
Figure 4. The Connection between Corporate Governance Practices and Effectiveness Criteria
Formalization of the best corporate governance practices serves as a background for the determination of the most essential elements to become the common practices or to be the source for regulation in this sphere.
Identification of the corporate governance effectiveness criteria is essential stage from both theoretical and practical points of view. Identified criteria serve as a background for the regulation on all stages -from internal corporate codes to national codes and international recommendations. The following scheme is to show the mutual influence of the banks" fulfillment of the criteria and regulation (see figure 5 ).
Corporate Governance Practices
Formalization of the Best Corporate Governance Practices: -on the company level (codes, guidelines, internal regulations etc); -on the national level (codes, legislation);
-on the international level (reports, recommendations etc).
Assessment of the Existing Corporate Governance Practices
Corporate Governance Effectiveness Criteria
Direct (e.g. number of independent directors, committees" composition issues, compensation-related issues etc) Indirect
Figure 5. Formalization-regulation cycle
As a common practice, only direct criteria (see Table 5 ) are used for regulation purposes as the link between them and effectiveness of the corporate governance is obvious -the direct criteria are the essentials of the best practices. Usually these indicators are specific enough to be used only for corporate governance effectiveness assessment. 
Board practices
Number of directors, proportion of the non-independent and independent directors, presence of the executive directors, number of committees and specific requirement for their composition etc.
Compensation
Structure of the compensation package, compensation dependence on performance, long-term compensation schemes etc.
Disclosure and transparency Level and frequency of disclosure etc.
Risk management Specific body in the over-all management structure and specific requirement for its composition etc.
Corporate governance structure Complexity and limpidity of the corporate structure etc.
However, there also might be indirect indicators of the corporate governance effectiveness (see Table 6 ).
Indirect criteria are easy to understand when answering the following questions 
Hypotheses
The correlation between performance of the bank and indirect effectiveness criteria is taken as supposition by stakeholders when assessing bank"s performance. And it sounds logical. However is that really this way? For the purpose of this part of research we will check the correlation between indirect corporate governance effectiveness criteria and performance indicators.
H1: Profit per share as an indirect criterion of the corporate governance effectiveness (stakeholders" group -customers/investors) could be used also as an indicator of the bank"s performance.
H2: Loan to deposit ratio as an indirect criterion of the corporate governance effectiveness (stakeholders" group -shareholders) could be used also as an indicator of the bank"s performance.
Empirical material

Data
For the purpose of this part of research 20 Ukrainian biggest banks in terms of assets (as for Jan 1, 2010; about 73% of the Ukrainian banking system) were under consideration (see Table 7 ). The following indicators were calculated and used:
-ROA (as an indicator of the bank's performance):
The return on assets formula, sometimes abbreviated as ROA, is a company's net income divided by its average of total assets. The return on assets formula looks at the ability of a company to utilize its assets to gain a net profit. 12 ROA is used as a bank"s performance indicator for the purpose of the following research.
-Loan to Deposit Ratio (as an indirect indicator of the corporate governance effectiveness):
The formula for the loan to deposit ratio is exactly as its name implies, loans divided by deposits. 6 The loan to deposit ratio is used to calculate a lending institution's ability to cover withdrawals made by its customers. A lending institution that accepts deposits must have a certain measure of liquidity to maintain its normal daily operations. Loans given to its customers are mostly not considered liquid meaning that they are investments over a longer period of time. Although a bank will keep a certain level of mandatory reserves, they may also choose to keep a percentage of their nonlending investing in short term securities to ensure that any monies needed can be accessed in the short term. 6 Loans in the numerator of the formula are investments or assets for a bank. Deposits in the denominator of the formula can be considered the same as debt as the individual depositors are essentially granting monies to the bank with a return equal to the deposit rates and that can be called upon at any time. In these respects, the loan to deposit ratio is similar to a liquidity ratio and debt ratio. The loan to deposit ratio can be used by investors and internally by the company to determine the financial institutions short term viability. Although many depositors may not be as concerned when a financial institution is insured, the loan to deposit ratio may be used to ensure that any money needed is immediately available. Banking insurance companies may also find this ratio or some variation of it of use when underwriting the policy to determine insurability.
13
Customers and investors, taken all mentioned above, could use Loan to Deposit Ratio as an indicator of the corporate governance effectiveness as basically management is responsible for policy in this sphere. The formula for earnings per share, or EPS, is a company's net income expressed on a per share basis. It is important to note that the earnings per share formula only references common stock and any preferred stock dividends is subtracted from the net income, if applicable. However EPS could be used by the shareholders as first indicator to consider while assessing corporate management. 
Descriptive statistics
This study uses data collected from the official annual reports of the 20 biggest Ukrainian banks for 5 years from 2006 till 2010. 
Range and standard deviation clearly indicate the widespread character of variables.
Unexpected findings about Loan to Deposit Ratio
At the preparation stage of the study we faced notable figures -the value of the Loan to Deposit Ratio in Ukrainian banks were many times higher that theoretical optimum is required (see Table 9 ). 
Average loan to deposit ratio 243,2372
The key issue about banks liquidity is money multiplier.14 When a loan to deposit ratio is below 100% a money multiplier (MM) is expressed by a formula: MM = 1/(1-LTD) where LTD is loan to deposit ratio expressed in decimal terms.
The loan to deposit ratio can fluctuate: i.e. if LTD is 50% then MM is 2, if LTD is 75% then MM is 4, if LTD is 90% then is 10, if LTD is 99% then MM is 100.
Ultimately, if loan to deposit ratio is always kept below 100% then, at any one time, the ratio of total loans to total deposits on the books gives an average loan to deposit ratio (ALTD). This average may be done for a particular bank or for a group of banks or for entire economy. A money multiplier calculated on the basis of such average, MM =1/(1-ALTD), is a measure of a particular bank"s liquidity, a group of banks liquidity or entire economy liquidity position. A bank's CEO can look at such figure and have an immediate good idea about the liquidity of his bank. The liquidity of the banking system could be estimated from the average value of the ratio.
Therefore if loan to deposit ratio is below 100%, the lower the loan to deposit ratio, the lower the money multiplier, the higher the "stickiness" of funds and the lower the liquidity risk. A ratio of total loans to total deposits gives a money multiplier at any one time and a good idea about underlying liquidity risk. Then a consideration can be given to "stickiness" of individual financial products (from current accounts to long term investments such as pensions).
When a loan to deposit ratio (LTD) is above (or equal) 100%, money multiplier (MM) is infinite.3 If LTD is above 100%, then the financial system becomes a classic example of a pyramid scheme.
Therefore in terms of liquidity if at any one time a ratio of total loans to total deposits is taken (which is higher than one) -per bank, a group of banks or entire financial system -it does not give any idea about the prevailing money multiplier as, unlike when loan to deposit ratio is below 100%, it also depends on a number of deposit -loan cycles and loan to deposit ratio of each of them. Therefore a bank"s CEO or State Government or Central Bank do not have an idea about the liquidity based on total loans to total deposits ratio.
It follows that if loan to deposit ratio is above (or equal) 100%, the higher the loan to deposit ratio, the faster the money multiplier growth.
However, in any event, the liquidity risk is 100% in a finite time.
It is a question when (in a finite time) and in which part of the system the liquidity crunch starts. This depends on various factors such as access to information or sophistication of depositors/investors in particular financial products who realise first that £1 real cash cannot cover ever growing, and without a limit, banks balance sheets and decide to withdraw their funding first.
Therefore it is not surprising at all, in the context of the financial crisis, that Ukrainian banking system has been having hard times. The issue needs to be analysed deeper diving consideration to the state regulation and risk management (e.g. assets management, bank"s credit policy and bad debts management in particular) in order to make conclusions on the subject (see next section for some more details).
Study results
Main study finding are as following:
-Loan to Deposit Ratio calculated for the top-20 biggest Ukrainian banks indicates the enormous liquidity risk. Consequently, it indicates problems with risk management that Ukrainian banks have. The deeper analysis of the issue is needed in order to estimate the current threats and possible scenarios.
-Correlation ratio between ROA and Loan to Deposit Ratio is -0,10107 that represents quite slight inverse relation between these two indicators. H2 was not confirmed: Loan to deposit ratio as an indirect criterion of the corporate governance effectiveness (stakeholders" group -shareholders) could NOT be used also as an indicator of the bank"s performance.
-Correlation ratio between ROA and EPS is 0,185275 that indicates absence of the substantial relation between net income per share and bank"s performance indicator. H1 was not confirmed: Profit per share as an indirect criterion of the corporate governance effectiveness (stakeholders" group -customers/investors) could NOT be used also as an indicator of the bank"s performance.
-The model for ROA prediction from Loan to Deposit Ration and EPS is very weak (see Table 10 ) and shows that the selected indirect criteria of the corporate governance effectiveness could hardly be used for ROA estimation. Equally checking the criteria of the corporate governance effectiveness is not the best way to assess and to predict bank"s performance. Other factors should be considered when building the math model to describe the relation between indicators of the corporate governance in the bank and bank"s performance (see next sections of the article). 
Conclusions and Further Research
In this section we investigated the role of the corporate governance effectiveness criteria, their types and link with bank"s performance indicator. We tried to execute empirical tests in order to discover the existence of the statistically significant link between bank"s performance and corporate governance effectiveness. We used ROA for measuring bank"s performance, EPS and Loan to Deposit Ratio as indirect indicators of corporate governance effectiveness for customers and shareholders respectively. Even though the relation between mentioned above indicators seems to be logical, at the present study no empirical evidence was found. The empirical data didn"t confirmed hypotheses of the study -the conclusion about ROA value could hardly be made with EPS and Loan to Deposit Ratio. However, we would like to point out that the following results represent Ukrainian banking system and could be differentiated in different countries (see Literature Review).
Quality of corporate governance and its impact on banks performance in Ukraine: Empirical Research
In the first step of the empirical analysis, we tried to measure the interaction between different regulatory variables. We came to the conclusion that the proposed number of variables is insufficient. Therefore, within the second stage we will extend the number of variables and their quality, using the model proposed by Peong Kwee Kim and Devinaga Rasiah (2010).
The Type of Bank Ownership as a Key Determinant of Corporate Governance
The type of bank ownership (such as privately domestic-owned banks (private-owned banks), state-owned banks, and foreign-owned banks) influences organisational culture, including relationships and behavior of different stakeholders. That leads to execution of different approaches to risk-management and managing bank performance.
H3:
There is a positive relationship between type of bank ownership and corporate governance.
Relationship between Corporate Governance and Bank Performance
The main role of bank managers is to fulfill shareholders" expectations, among them to maximise return on shareholders investment (actually good bank performance). The role of bank managers, while representing bank owners" interests, is to implement the policy that includes bank"s risk-taking strategy (usually the risks bank faces are higher than socially expected and this strategy leads to higher rate of return). Besides representation of the shareholders" interests, managers as separate agents could represent interests of different stakeholders groups and even have their own aims. Managers have the possibility to redistribute the profit of the bank in order to increase their own incentives and compensation (Jensen 1986; Murphy 1985) . While doing so, they shrink not only shareholders" profit but also profit planned to be used for CSR purposes. However, they could possibly restrain their expropriating behavior if the level of bankruptcy risk is beyond their control. Agency theory suggests the firms to involve managers into compensation schemes with options that give the right to buy a number of share on a discounted price, so to make them insiders. This mechanism shifts the conflict of interests towards owners/managers and public/depositors. Regulator protects the public interest by issuing rules to force owners and managers of the bank to obey them. This situation leads each party towards "prisoners" dilemma". Agency mechanism could not solve the multi-conflict sufficiently. It needs willingness from each party to change their perspective and to concern the other party"s interests. In this perspective, they should focus on optimal result rather than maximum result due to other party"s constraint.
All parties (stakeholders) expect the bank to represent their interests in the long-term perspective. The banks should be considered not only as financial intermediaries but also as interest intermediaries. Banks that successfully fulfill all stakeholders" interests usually have good corporate governance. As the interest of owners is to earn better return on their investment (equity), they will attempt to implement better corporate governance. Based on this argument, the hypothesis 4 can be stated as follows:
H4:
Better corporate governance will lead to better bank performance.
The Sensitivity of Model Relationships on Type of Bank Ownership
The two hypotheses represent the test that will help to indicate whether bank implements good corporate governance or not. However, confirming the hypothesis 3 is not sufficient to conclude that bank has a good corporate governance practice. It requires further analysis and investigation to meet a sufficient condition (stated below) to conclude that corporate governance could balance interests of different parties. Managers and owners of bank who show efforts and intention to implement good corporate governance will increase their credibility in the market.
Agency theory suggests that conflict of interests can be reduced if owners have enough power to control the operations of the bank. Power of owners depends on their stakes. Higher power of control commonly appears in privately or closely owned banks compared to widely owned banks. In many developing countries there are a lot of stateowned banks. State-owned bank represents perfect type of widely owned bank (considering agency theory). The principals (public) have no power to control the agents. Other types of ownership commonly found in developing countries are foreign-owned banks and joint-venture-owned banks. Previous studies found that foreign-owned banks outperform domestic-owned banks in developing countries (Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney 2000; and Havrylchyk 2003). The results suggest that reputable foreign-owned banks may be able to implement better corporate governance than domestic-owned banks do.
In Ukraine the type of ownerships can be classified into three major groups: private domesticowned banks, state-owned banks, and foreignowned banks. Private domestic-owned banks could be described as the ones where the major proportion of ownerships is concentrated among small numbers of controlling shareholders. State-owned banks represent perfectly dispersed ownership. The principals (citizens) have less power to control the banks, thus controlling ownership of the banks fully come from the agents. Foreign-owned banks (excluded joint-venture-owned banks) are controlled by more dispersed ownership than domestic ownership. DeAngelo (1985) , and Zingales (1994) suggest that major controlling shareholders lead the owners to expropriating the assets of banks to maximise their interests. Thus, foreign-owned banks may implement good corporate governance better than domestic-owned banks.
Theoretically, major controlling shareholders maximise their interests by expropriating operating assets of banks. Hence, domestic-owned banks may have potential problem with implementing good corporate governance. However, state-owned banks could be in the centre of the conflict of interests especially when it comes to multi-agents. There are three perspectives that can explain the relationship between the role of state-owned banks and their performance. Political perspective suggests that state-owned companies may be intervened by the regime to increase their popularity and political voting (Shapiro and Willig 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Agency perspective suggests that state-owned banks have no principals who have enough power to control the banks. Social welfare perspective suggests that state-owned companies serve special mission and support government policy. It seems that state-owned banks have more problems with implementation of good corporate governance than domestic owned banks do. It supports the argument that state-owned banks underperform domestic-owned banks (Bonin et al. Furthermore, foreign-owned banks have different characteristics from domestic-owned banks due to different organizational cultures of the banks themselves, rules and regulations in the original countries. The foreign-owned banks may have long-time experience in legal enforcement and banking supervision that leads to implementing better practices of corporate governance. They also have advantages in technology used, services provided, innovation implemented, and experience gained. Different researches indicated that different types of ownership may have different intentions and mechanisms for implementing good corporate governance. Foreign-owned banks implement good corporate governance better than domestic-owned and state-owned banks. Thus, hypothesis 5a and 5b can be stated as follows:
H5a:
Relationship between corporate governance and bank performance is more sensitive for foreign-owned banks than for private domesticowned banks.
H5b:
Relationship between corporate governance and bank performance is more sensitive for private domestic-owned banks than for stateowned banks.
Data and Samples
This research uses secondary data as the main data to measure and analyse the practices of corporate governance and performance in the Ukrainian banking system. The study employs the annual reports and financial statements of twenty private domestically-owned banks, twenty foreignowned banks and three state-owned banks in Ukraine, as the sources of samples data for the sample period from 2006 to 2009, as well as and other materials from the National Bank of Ukraine. The idea behind the empirical analysis of this research is to analyse the effectiveness of corporate governance practices in domestically owned banks and foreign-owned banks and state-owned banks in the pre crisis (from 2006 to 2007 period), and during crisis (from 2008 to 2009 period). Thus, this research selects the sample period from 2006 to 2009 in order to find the trends in the pre-and during-crisis. Thus, the research sample in the study represents approximately 25 percent out of a total 175 commercial banks in Ukraine, which hold 79,09% assets of the banking system. Furthermore, this research focuses only on the annual reports, balance sheets, and profit and loss accounts in their annual reports. The details on research sample in this research are as follows: 
Operational Definition and Measurement of Variables
The performance of the bank and corporate governance are pretty difficult concepts in terms of defining and measuring. This study concerns two concepts: corporate governance and bank performance. This section attempts to convert these concepts into specific variables that can be defined and measured operationally. This study employs some relevant variables to describe each concept.
Proxy Variable for Bank Performance
Bank performance has been defined as the final result of an activity, and the appropriate measure selected to assess corporate performance depends on the type of organization which is to be evaluated, so that the objectives of the research will be achieved through that evaluation. Good bank performance is one of the shareholder"s interests. This study employs one proxy for bank performance -return on shareholder"s investment, called return on equity (ROE). This variable equation can be calculated as follows:
Proxy
Variables for Corporate Governance
Corporate governance (CG) consists of external corporate governance and internal corporate governance that represents public"s interest, employee"s interest, and owner"s interest. External corporate governance is defined as a mechanism, which appeals to the government responsibility to control the operations of bank through prevailing bank regulation. Bank"s health could be defined from some financial ratios (Supriyatna et al. 2007 ).
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is capital divided by risk-weighted average assets. Capital included in the CAR comprises main capital and secondary capital. National Bank of Ukraine determines that banks should reserve minimum level of CAR (at the moment 10%). The CAR value represents the degree of bank"s obedience to the rules that serve and protect the public interest. Larger CAR value represents higher banks" sensitivity towards public interest. Konishi and Yasuda (2004) find that the implementation of the capital adequacy requirement reduces risk-taking of commercial banks. Thus, this ratio represents a good proxy for the implementation of good corporate governance mechanism. This study also considers some financial ratios that are related to the CAR. Supriyatna (2006) develops model to get composite value of corporate governance effectiveness based on the bank ownership. He uses six exogenous variables which are also relevant to assess corporate governance: capital ratio (CR), cash claim on central bank (CCC), secondary reserve ratio (SRR), loan to deposits ratio (LDR), loan loss provisioning (LLP) and fixed assets and inventories to capital (FAI). We used the model assuming the calculation of the variable using the following formula:
Type of Bank Ownership
Types of bank ownership consist of foreignowned banks, joint venture-owned banks, private domestic-owned banks, and state-owned banks. This study uses two complexes of variables to identify three different types of bank ownership (domestically owned banks, foreign owned banks and state owned banks).
Regression Model
This study uses simultaneous equation model. The coefficient parameters will be estimated using generalised method of moment (GMM). This technique is useful to eliminate the econometric assumption problem. The regression model of Kwee Kim, Devinaga Rasiah (2010) 
Data Analysis Method
This research uses two types of data analysis methods to analyse the sample data. The two types of methods are: descriptive and inferential statistical analysis, and regression model analysis. These techniques are used to test the hypotheses, solve research questions, and achieve goals and objectives of the study. Moreover they also could be used to examine the relationships among the governance mechanisms and performance of selected domestically owned banks, state owned banks and foreign-owned banks, and this research uses the simultaneous method as a method to analyse the selected sample data. This research attempts to determine which types of bank ownership differ significantly on the practices of corporate governance executed and on bank performance before and during financial crisis.
The descriptive statistics examines the mean and standard deviation of regression variables. The regression results report the simultaneous equation model by using a general method of moment technique for private domestically owned banks, foreign-owned banks and state-owned banks. This research measures the appropriateness to fit the regression model for ROE and CAR using the r squared (R 2 ) value. R 2 represents the proportion of variation of the dependent variable, accounted for by the independent variables in the regression model. The highest R 2 value indicates the strong predictability of a regression model. The lowest R 2 value shows the weak predictability of a regression model. This research also observes significant pvalue and t-test of the regression model in order to determine the significance tests of the regression coefficients.
We use inferential statistics to make inferences or judgments about reality on the basis of a research sample (Zikmud 2003) . In addition, the Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS 19.0) software was used to analyse the data. In general, the descriptive statistics indicate that state-owned banks attempt to be more concerned about implementing good corporate governance practices than other banks do. Indeed, they have ability to control their risk management in order to perform well. The findings suggest that state-owned banks have better ability to integrate the corporate governance and the bank performance. Despite their performance in time of crisis, foreign-owned bank have higher return on equity before crisis than the other types of banks do.
Findings
The next section of this research provides further investigation of interrelationship between corporate governance and bank performance. The analysis focuses on the sensitivity of these interrelationships on different types of bank ownership.
Regression Results
The regression results are divided into three categories. The first category is regression results for domestically owned banks. The second category is regression results for foreign-owned banks. The third category is regression results for state-owned banks.
Regression
Results
For Private Domestic-owned Banks
The model is estimated by generalized method of moment (GMM) in a system of simultaneous equations. The simultaneous regression model of corporate governance and bank performance for private domestically owned banks are presented as follows:
1) CAR D = α 1 + β1 CR + β2 FAI + ε1 2) ROE D = α 1 + β1 CAR D + ε2 Table 13 shows the regression analysis for corporate governance before and during crisis for private domestically owned banks in Ukraine. The variables involved in the corporate governance estimation for private domestically owned banks are capital ratio (CR), fixed assets and inventories to capital ratio (FAI). The table shows that capital ratio (CR) and Fixed Assets and Inventories to Capital ratio (FAI) had negative effect on CAR in pre crisis period, while capital ratio (CR) during crisis had positive effect on CAR. However, only one variable had significant effect on CAR at 5% level of alpha, this is capital ratio (CR) during crisis. The table shows that proposed variables had insignificant effect on CAR.
The first equation provides composite index of corporate governance. In general, the results provide bad estimation of coefficients of parameters and relatively low R 2 of 4,10% and 16,10% respectively before and during crisis. Low R 2 value indicates the weak predictability of a regression model. Therefore, adjusted R 2 for this equation is -1,1% and 11,6% before and during crisis respectively. The first equation in Table 8 The regression analysis for corporate governance in domestically owned banks has F value before and during crisis of 46,265 and 3,857 resp. Moreover, the results of regression model of bank performance for domestically owned banks in the pre-and post-crisis are presented in table 14. The results shows corporate governance (CAR) has insignificant effect on bank performance (ROE) at five percents level of alpha. CAR also has negative relationship with bank performance (ROE). Therefore, there is unintentional assumption that the normative regulation of the National Bank of Ukraine has a slight negative impact on the profitability of the bank. Adjusted R 2 for this model is 0,047 and 0,119 before and during crisis. F value of this model in domestically owned banks is 9,50 and 1,70 before and during crisis.
Regression Results For Foreign-owned Banks
For foreign-owned banks, the regression model of corporate governance and bank ownership are also estimated by generalized method of moment (GMM) in a system of simultaneous equations. The simultaneous regression model of corporate governance and bank performance for domestic-owned banks are shown as follows: 1) CAR F = α 1 + β1 CR + β2 FAI + β3 OWN F + ε1
2) ROE F = α 1 + β1 CARF + ε2 In addition, the results of regression model of bank performance for foreign-owned banks in the pre and during crisis are presented in table 16. Table 16 shows the empirical regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance in foreign-owned banks. The results show that corporate governance (CAR) has no significant effect on bank performance (ROE) at five percents level of alpha. CAR also has positive relationship with bank performance (ROE). Foreign-owned banks have adjusted R 2 and F value of this model which are -0,021 and 65,80 percents before crisis and 0,014 and 22,3 percents during crisis.
Regression Results For State-owned Banks
For state-owned banks, the regression model of corporate governance and bank ownership are also estimated by generalised method of moment (GMM), in a system of simultaneous equations. The simultaneous regression model of corporate governance and bank performance for state-owned banks are shown as follows 1) CAR S = α 1 + β1 CR + β2 FAI + β3 OWN S + ε1 2) ROE S = α 1 + β1 CAR S + ε2 Table 17 states that state-owned banks have positive capital ratio and foreign ownership effects on CAR before and during crisis. However, fixed assets and inventories to capital ratio has negative relationship with CAR.
There is no clear relationship between capital, fixed assets and inventories to capital and ownership structure towards corporate governance. R 2 = 24,60% before crisis (8,40 during crisis) suggests that changes in the dependent variable are difficult to explain In addition, the results of regression model of bank performance for state-owned banks before and during crisis are presented in table 18. Table 18 shows the empirical regression results for the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance in state-owned banks. The results shows corporate governance (CAR) has no significant effect on bank performance (ROE) at five percents level of alpha. CAR also has positive relationship with bank performance (ROE). Foreign-owned banks have adjusted R 2 and F value of this model which are 0,010 and 36,40 percents in pre-crisis and 0,012 and 36,1 percents during crisis.
Implication
The research shows failure included in the equation of the explanatory variables (one or several) to describe the dependent variable. Also, the question arises about multicollinearity of the model variables: the inclusion of factors with high multicollinearity can lead to unintended consequences -it could lead to the unreliability of estimated regression coefficients and the system of normal equations not being reliable. In addition, if there is high correlation coefficient among the factors, it is impossible to determine their effect on the isolated score index and the parameters of the regression equations are hard to interpret.
Subsequent content analysis will address the question of whether to include in a model of factors based on assumptions of economic theory.
Meaningful analysis solves the problem of establishing the links between the phenomena.
Conclusion
Our paper brings to light the importance of corporate governance before and during financial crisis. We use a comprehensive dataset on 43 banks, including 20 foreign-owned banks (representing 15 countries), that were at the center of the crisis. Our results show that bank corporate governance is important as poor corporate governance may result in bank failures thus endangering the stability of the financial system. Furthermore, poor corporate governance may lead to the lack of market confidence in the bank"s ability to manage its assets, which in turn might trigger bank runs or liquidity crisis 15 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). Hence, the issue of regulation is especially important in the context of banks. In addition, bank operations are less transparent, the range of stakeholders affected by the operations is wider and the different characteristics of traditional and non-traditional banking operations impose challenges on bank corporate governance. Thus these four elements make bank corporate governance different from the corporate governance in other companies. The government regulates deposit insurance and the implicit guarantee that large banks will be bailedout by the government to ensure financial system stability, which reduces the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. In addition to reducing the incentives for depositors to monitor the bank, deposit insurance also encourages banks to take on more risk.
Presented model attempts to explain the effect of external forces on corporate governance and bank performance. These external factors are represented by composite value of capital ratio and type of bank ownership. Higher composite value 15 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), Overview of the new Basel Capital Accord, Consultative document
